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Statement showing Jurisdiction: 
Jurisdiction of this appeal is conferred on this Court pursuant to section §78-2a-3(2)(e) of 
the Utah Code. 
Statement of the Issues 
Appellant asserts the following issues on appeal: 
Issue 1: 
a. The American Fork City Municipal ordinances at Chapter 8.08 Nuisance 
Abatement and Beautification Ordinance is unenforceable. It does not comply 
with the requirements of Utah Code Annotated §10-9a-515 (l)which trumps or 
preempts it. 
b. Determinative Law: §UCA 10-9a-515 (1) 
c. Standard of Review: de novo. Statutory Interpretation (Sill v Hart, 2005 UT 
537 f7), Public Policy Implications (State v Levin, 2006 UT 50 ffif 20-24, 29 - 31) 
Issue 2: 
a. The Motion to Set Aside the Judgment should have been granted. 
b. Determinative Law: Utah State Constitution, Section 7; Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, Rule 16, 5b 
c. Standard of Review: de novo. Statutory Interpretation (Sill v Hart, 2005 UT 
537 f7), Public Policy Implications (State v Levin, 2006 UT 50 ffif 20-24, 29 - 31) 
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Determinative Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances and rules 
47 C.F.R. Part 97 
101 FCC 2nd 952 (1985) PRB-1 
Utah Code Annotated §10-9a-515 Regulation of amateur radio antennas. 
Utah State Constitution, Section 7 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 16 
Statement of the Case 
a. Nature of the Case 
Tfl Defendant has stored, in his back yard, empty containers which have value to him 
and with which he plans to construct an amateur radio tower to support an antenna and 
perhaps wind generation rotors for the production of electrical power.(Response, lines 
46-48) The back yard is completely surrounded by privacy fencing with no gaps greater 
than 2 inches between fence sections and buildings and less than 2 inches below any gate 
or fence section. All gates are kept closed and latched. American Fork City brought suit 
against the defendant citing violation of 08,080 Nuisance Abatement and Beautification 
Ordinance, but chose to shorten the name to 08.080.030 Beautification Ordinance before 
the Trial Court when the real title for the section 08.080.030 which they cite is Prohibited 
Conduct—Definition of Nuisance. 
b. Course of proceedings 
1J2 American Fork City brought suit against the defendant for violation of Chapter 
7 
8.08 Nuisance Abatement and Beautification Ordinance and more specifically 8.08.030 
Prohibited conduct —Definition of nuisance. The Pretrial Hearing was aborted due to 
defendant filing a Motions for Dismissal. After the defendant had been excused, the 
prosecutor chased him down and showed defendant photos that could only have been 
taken by entry into the backyard of the property. A request for copies of those photos was 
verbally made by the defendant. At a subsequent hearing, the trial judge denied both 
Motions for Dismissal. Defendant attempted to file an appeal with the trial court after 
that hearing, but the clerk of the court refused to accept it and told defendant that he 
would have to wait until after the trial concluded. No further hearings were held prior to 
trial. Specifically a complete pretrial hearing was not held. No communications were 
had between the City and the defendant prior to the trail. Specifically no photos, witness 
lists or other discovery documents were supplied to the defendant. Trial was held in the 
absence of the defendant. Defendant was made aware that he had been tried in absentia 
when a letter arrived at his residence notifying him that he needed to appear for 
Sentencing. This notice arrived the day before the Sentencing Hearing. Prior to the 
Sentencing Hearing, defendant filed a Motion to Set Aside the Judgment. At the 
Sentencing hearing, defendants Motion to Set Aside the Judgment was denied by the 
judge, then sentence and an order were issued. Defendant filed an appeal following 
sentencing. 
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c. disposition at trial court 
Tf3 Defendant was found guilty of violation of Am. Fork 8.08.030 Beautification 
Ordinance, fined $1000 suspended and jail of 180 days suspended, order to clean and 
secure a Certificate of Clean Bill of Health from Environmental Quality within 60 days. 
Relevant Facts with citation to the record 
f 4 Defendant filed a Motions for Dismissal with a First Motion for Dismissal and a 
Second Motion for Dismissal, (transcript, page 3, lines 14,15) (Motions for Dismissal, 
Response to Memorandum in Opposition...) 
Trial Judge tells defendant to make arguments for both Motions for Dismissal, 
(transcript, page 3, lines 14 - 18) 
Defendant made arguments about the enforceability of the ordinance citing trumping 
State Law. (transcript, page 5, lines 5-18) 
Prosecutor says "I don't even know where he's coming from with that" (transcript, page 6, 
lines 12-13) 
Trial Judge denies second cause for dismissal, (transcript, page 8 line 1) 
Prosecutor interprets the statute for the Judge incorrectly, (transcript, page 6, lines 7-13) 
Trial Judge says "Not before this Court" (transcript; page 6, line 16; p8, lines 1-3) 
Defendant Filed a Motion To Set Aside The Judgment which was denied. (Trial Court 
case notes 12/17/2008, p51) 
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Summary of Argument 1 
f 5 This issue is being tried de novo, so Appellant will attempt to make all arguments 
that have been made in pleadings and in oral argument before the Trial Court for the 
benefit of the Appeals Court. 
Tf6 The Federal Communications Commission(FCC), issued PRB-1 in 1985. Utah 
enacted §10-9a-515 in 2005. American Fork City purchased from the West Company, 
Inc. a body of statutes for a City. This body of ordinances does not comply with 
§10-9a-515 and is thereby rendered unenforceable by §10-9a-515 which tramps or 
preempts it. The issue was placed before the court both in pleadings and oral argument. 
The Trial court erred in interpreting this statute and the case should have been dismissed 
and never gone to trial. 
Detail of Argument 1 
f 7 Appellant holds an FCC Extra Class Amateur Radio licensee, the highest license 
class attainable, with call sign WB7PZA and station location at 70 West 400 North, 
American Fork, Utah as issued by the FCC. Defendant is also a member of Civil Air 
Patrol (CAP) and the Radio Amateur Emergency Service (RACES). 
f 8 Amateur Radio Operators, commonly referred to as Ham Radio Operators or 
Hams, play a critical role in disaster communications. With little or no help from any 
level of government, they equip themselves with stations consisting of transceivers 
attached to antennas supported by towers or other structures that enable them to have 
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worldwide communications capabilities both to send and receive messages in good times 
and in times of disaster when there is no power. Many times the first reports out of a 
disaster area are from Ham operators in the middle of the disaster who have equipped 
their stations with emergency power generation systems and are using makeshift antennas 
if their permanent antennas have been damaged. In the event that the signal from the 
sending station is weak, a receiving station needs a good antenna system in order to 
solidly pass messages to and from the disaster area. The higher above ground an antenna 
is, the better it will perform. Due to the danger of airplanes running into tall towers, the 
Federal Communications Commission (hereinafter abbreviated as FCC) has regulated 
Ham radio antennas and towers for many years. 
f 9 In recent years, Ham Radio operators who put up antennas and towers, not near 
airports, have been the target of harassment from governmental entities using zoning 
ordinances, revocation of permits, exorbitant fees, nuisance, health and beautification 
ordinances and other tactics. This became such a problem for amateur radio operators in 
the 1980fs that the FCC stepped in at the request of the Amateur Radio Relay League 
(ARRL), an Amateur Radio national advocacy group. After public comment, the FCC 
issued what has come to be known as PRB-1. It is formally cited as Amateur Radio 
Preemption, 101 FCC 2nd 952 (1985), and has been codified at 47 C.F.R. Part 97. The 
FCC ruled that local governments must grant "reasonable accommodations" to Ham radio 
operators in the erection of antennas and their associated towers and other structures and 
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also that the regulations needed to be the minimum practicable regulation to accomplish 
their legitimate purposes. The reasonableness of the accommodations would be from the 
viewpoint of view of the Commission and not that of the local government. PRB-1 gives 
any licensed individual who wishes to put up an antenna or tower recourse if he is hassled 
in putting it up. This is because the Federal preemption trumps or preempts any state or 
local law. In like manner, a state law trumps or preempts any local ordinance. 
TflO Utah has Statutes which mandate compliance with PRB-1 at the county and local 
levels. The State Statute for local governments, which defendant cited to the court, 
(transcript, page 5, lines 5-18) is: 
§10-9a-515. Regulation of amateur radio antennas. 
(1) A municipality may not enact or enforce an ordinance that does not comply with 
the ruling of the Federal Communications Commission in "Amateur Radio Preemption, 
101 FCC 2nd 952 (1985)" or a regulation related to amateur radio service adopted under 
47 C.F.R. Part 97. 
(2) If a municipality adopts an ordinance involving the placement, screening, or height 
of an amateur radio antenna based on health, safety, or aesthetic conditions, the ordinance 
shall: 
(a) reasonably accommodate amateur radio communications; and 
(b) represent the minimal practicable regulation to accomplish the municipality's 
12 
purpose. 
f 11 The language of this statute makes it effective for all citizens, not just Hams. It 
applies even if there is no antenna evident, contemplated or applied for since the verbiage 
of the statute does not mention antennas. The Trial court erred in ruling that §10-9a-515 
does not apply if there is no antenna, (transcript, page 8, lines 8-10) In section (1), this 
statute requires on its face that a ordinance must comply with PRB1 or it may not be 
enforced. In section (2) aesthetic conditions are mentioned. The court erred in ruling 
that Beautification has nothing to do with antennas (transcript, page 7, lines 3-5) since 
aesthetics are in the verbiage of the law. 
f 12 The prosecutor misled the Trial Court when he feigned misunderstanding of where 
the defendant was coming from. Both the prosecutor and the court had defendants 
Response to Memorandum in Opposition... which lays out the argument. (Response to 
Memorandum..., lines 35 - 44) By feigning misunderstanding, the prosecutor was 
successful in getting the Judge to state that the matter was not before the court when it 
had been a central theme in all the pleadings prior to the hearing. 
Further discussion of Argument 1 
Tf 13 § 10-9a-515 is an extension of the Federal preemption in PRB-1. The phrase "an 
ordinance" could be interpreted broadly or narrowly. If interpreted broadly, the entire 
body of the ordinances of a Utah municipality are rendered unenforceable if they do not 
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comply with the provisions of PRB-1 as of the date that this Statute was enacted. If 
interpreted narrowly, only ordinances such as those enumerated in section (2) and in 
PRB-1 would be effected. These would include, but not be limited to, Zoning, Nuisance, 
Health, Safety and Beautification. Exactly the ordinances that the defendant is accused 
of violating. 
[^14 For purposes of this appeal, Appellant chooses to adopt the narrow interpretation. 
He does this since he was charged and prosecuted under 8.08 Nuisance Abatement and 
Beautification Ordinance, Antennas and towers have been declared nuisances or eye-
sores in many localities and so are clearly covered under PRB-1. American City 
Ordinance 08.080 does not comply with PRB-1 and therefore cannot be enforced. The 
trial court erred in denying defendant's second Cause for Diamissal in his Motions for 
Dismissal, (transcript, page 8 line 1) 
[^15 Next comes a question of what would it mean to comply or how an ordinance 
could comply. The word "comply" is not found in Black's Law Dictionary, Eighth 
Edition. If we look to (2) of §10-9a-515 we can see what compliance might look like. It 
enumerates two conditions which must be addressed before an ordinance can be enacted 
and enforced. They are reasonable accommodations and minimal practicable regulation 
towards Amateur Radio Communications. 
\ 16 8.08. Nuisance Abatement and Beautification Ordinance meets the narrow test as 
being the type of ordinance that could affect amateur radio communications under the 
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second paragraph of §10-9a-515 and so it must comply with PRB-1 if it is to be enforced. 
There is nothing about reasonable accommodations or minimal practicable regulation to 
be found in the ordinance. In like manner, Appellant asserts that every other other 
ordinance of American Fork City will be found lacking. Appellant asks the Appeals court 
to clarify the standards by which §10-9a-515 is to be applied to the ordinances of a 
municipality, and also to those of a county, so that a clear public policy can be defined. 
[^17 The West Company Inc. sold this package of municipal ordinances to cities 
throughout the State of Utah. There are probably other municipalities that will have their 
ordinances rendered unenforceable because of §10-9a-515. This constitutes a major 
public policy issue. If the ordinances of American Fork became unenforceable as of the 
2005 enactment date of §10-9a-515, there are going to be a lot of traffic citations that will 
have to be vacated and refunded. For that reason, Appellant asks that the opinion of the 
Appeals Court be published so that any city with nonconforming ordinances may be 
properly notified. 
Summary of Argument 2 
If 18 Due to the lack of a proper Pretrial Hearing and the failure of the Prosecutor to 
provide defendant with required discovery documents prior to trial, the defendant's right 
to due process was denied. 
Detail of Argument 2 
f 19 The Pretrial Hearing shown on the Trial Court case notes was truncated by the 
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Judge when the defendant said he had filed Motions for Dismissal. During the Motions 
for Dismissal Hearing, the Judge did not give the defendant any opportunity to ask for a 
pretrial hearing and set the matter for a hearing after having told the defendant to sit 
down and wait a minute, (transcript, page 8, line 6 and 13). This effectively made the 
conversation between the Judge and Prosecutor a private conversation. Defendant 
expected to receive witness lists and other requested documentation well before a Trail as 
required of the Prosecution in the Rules of Criminal Procedure. No disclosures of any 
kind were made to the defense other than through the Information at arraignment. The 
complaining officer did not testify, but some other official did. There is also mention of 
an Elizabeth Batty of whom the defendant has no knowledge, especially knowledge that 
should have come to him from the prosecution on a List of Possible Witnesses. None of 
the required discovery materials or information were disclosed to the defendant prior to 
the trail, even though Rule 16 in section 5b says that all information will be made 
available before a defendant is required to plead, and that it is then a continuing duty. 
The Prosecution failed in this continuing duty. This lack of due process caused the 
defendant to let the matter slip from his mind and miss the hearing. The Court should 
have granted defendant's Motion to Set Aside the Judgment when this breach of the Rules 
of Procedure was brought to his attention in the Motion, and should have set the matter 
for Pretrial Conference or a new trial. 
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Conclusion 
f^20 Appellant has had his privacy invaded under color of law, been denied due 
process, had motions denied that should have been granted if the law had been applied 
correctly, been prosecuted and convicted under ordinances that are unenforceable by the 
letter of trumping State law. The trial court erred by not dismissing the case when 
presented with that law and hearing arguments relevant to it. The trial court also erred by 
not granting defendant's Motion to Set Aside The Judgment when it was presented to the 
court. 
Relief Sought 
f 21 Appellant asks the Appeals Court to vacate the judgment and order, rule that 
American Fork City's 8.08.030 Nuisance Abatement and Beautification Ordinance 
ordinance is unenforceable, rule that all other ordinances that could be used to affect his 
ability to construct a tower from the raw materials in his backyard are unenforceable. He 
asks the Appeals Court to Dismiss with prejudice the case against him. Appellant asks 
for an order that American Fork City be barred from charging or prosecuting him under 
any effected ordinance once it is brought into compliance with PRB-1, but rather 
grandfather his uses of the property and materials stored on his property under the new 
ordinances. Appellant asks that the Appeals Court put forth a standard for interpretation 
for application to §10-9a-515 and §17-27a-514. He also asks the Appeals Court to 
censure the Prosecuting Attorney for his lack of providing required documents to 
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defendant prior to trial. Appellant asks for any other relief that the Court of Appeals 
might see fit to grant him. 
Signature, 
Filed with the Court of Appeals, 10/9/09 
Karl Peterson /O/'f/o f 
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Certificate of Service 
I certify that a copy of this Appellants Brief document was served upon the following 
party listed below by the method indicated: 
American Fork City and Appellee's Counsel 
by placement in the box at the courthouse set aside for the purpose of service 
Karl Peterson 
Dated: tP/^/ZOOf 
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Addendum 
a. PRB-1 
b. Utah State Law City §10-9a-515 
c. Utah State Law County §17-27a-514 
d. Sill v Hart 
e. State v Levin 
f. Motions for Dismissal. 
g. Response to Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants Motion to Dismiss, 
h. Motion to Set Aside The Judgment 
i. American Fork Ordinance 8.08 
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Memorandum Opinion and Order in PRB-1 
Memorandum Opinion and Order in PRB-1 
Before the 
Federal Communications Commission FCC 85-506 
Washington, DC 20554 36149 
In the Matter of 
Federal preemption of state and 
local regulations pertaining 
to Amateur radio facilities. 
PRB-1 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
Adopted: September 16, 1985 /Released: September 19, 1985 
By the Commission: Commissioner Rivera not participating. 
Background 
1. On July 16, 1984, the American Radio Relay League, Inc 
(ARRL) filed a Request for Issuance of a Declaratory Ruling 
asking us to delineate the limitations of local zoning and other 
local and state regulatory authority over Federally-licensed 
radio facilities. Specifically, the ARRL wanted an explicit 
statement that would preempt all local ordinances which provably 
preclude or significantly inhibit effective reliable amateur 
radio communications. The ARRL acknowledges that local 
authorities can regulate amateur installations to insure the 
safety and health of persons in the community, but believes that 
those regulations cannot be so restrictive that they preclude 
effective amateur communications. 
2. Interested parties were advised that they could file 
comments in the matter.\fn 1/ With extension, comments were due 
on or before December 26, 1984,\fn 2/ with reply comments due on 
or before January 25, 1985 \fn 3/ Over sixteen hundred comments 
were filed. 
Local Ordinances 
3. Conflicts between amateur operators regarding radio 
antennas and local authorities regarding restrictive ordinances 
are common. The amateur operator is governed by the regulations 
contained in Part 97 of our rules. Those rules do not limit the 
height of an amateur antenna but they require, for aviation 
safety reasons, that certain FAA notification and FCC approval 
procedures must be followed for antennas which exceed 200 feet in 
height above ground level or antennas which are to be erected 
near airports. Thus, under FCC rules some antenna support 
structures require obstruction marking and lighting. On the 
other hand, local municipalities or governing bodies frequently 
enact regulations limiting antennas and their support structures 
in height and location, e.g. to side or rear yards, for health, 
safety or aesthetic considerations. These limiting regulations 
can result in conflict because the effectiveness of the 
communications that emanate from an amateur radio station are 
directly dependent upon the location and the height of the 
antenna. Amateur operators maintain that they are precluded from 
operating in certain bands allocated for their use if the height 
of their antennas is limited by a local ordinance. 
4. Examples of restrictive local ordinances were submitted by 
several amateur operators in this proceeding. Stanley J. Cichy, 
San Diego, California, noted that in San Diego amateur radio 
antennas come under a structures ruling which limits building 
heights to 30 feet. Thus, antennas there are also limited to 30 
feet. Alexander Vrenios, Mundelein, Illinois wrote that an 
ordinance or the Village of Mundelein provides that an antenna 
must be a distance from the property line that is equal to one 
and one-half times its height. In his case, he is limited to an 
antenna tower for his amateur station just over 53 feet in 
height. 
5. John C. Chapman, an amateur living in Bloomington, 
Minnesota, commented that he was not able to obtain a building 
permit to install an amateur radio antenna exceeding 35 feet in 
height because the Bloomington city ordinance restricted 
"structures" heights to 35 feet. Mr. Chapman said that the 
ordinance, when written, undoubtedly applied,to buildings but was 
now being applied to antennas in the absence of a specific 
ordinance regulating them. There were two options open to him if 
he wanted to engage in amateur communications. He could request 
a variance to the ordinance by way of hearing before the City 
Council, or he could obtain affidavits from his neighbors 
swearing that they had no objection to the proposed antenna 
installation. He got the building permit after obtaining the 
cooperation of his neighbors. His concern, however, is that he 
had to get permission from several people before he could 
effectively engage radio communications for which he had a valid 
FCC amateur license. 
6. In addition to height restrictions, other limits are 
enacted by local jurisdictions--anti-climb devices on towers or 
fences around them; minimum distances from high voltage power 
lines; minimum distances of towers from property lines; and 
regulations pertaining to the structural soundness of the antenna 
installation. By and large, amateurs do not find these safety 
precautions objectionable. What they do object to are the 
sometimes prohibitive, non-refundable application filing fees to 
obtain a permit to erect an antenna installation and those 
provisions in ordinances which regulate antennas for purely 
aesthetic reasons. The amateurs contend, almost universally, 
that "beauty is in the eye of the beholder." They assert that an 
antenna installation is not more aesthetically displeasing than 
other objects that people keep on their property, e.g. motor 
homes, trailers, pick-up trucks, solar collectors and gardening 
equipment. 
Restrictive Covenants 
7. Amateur operators also oppose restrictions on their 
amateur operations which are contained in the deeds for their 
homes or in their apartment leases. Since these restrictive 
covenants are contractual agreements between private parties, 
they are not generally a matter of concern to the Commission. 
However, since some amateurs who commented in this proceeding 
provided us with examples of restrictive covenants, they are 
included for information Mr. Eugene 0. Thomas of Hollister, 
California included in his comments an extract of the Declaration 
of Covenants and Restrictions for Ridgemark Estates, County of 
San Benito, State of California. It provides: 
No antenna for transmission or reception of radio signals 
shall be erected outdoors for use by any dwelling unit except 
upon approval of the Directors. No radio or television 
signals or any other form of electromagnetic radiation shall 
be permitted to originate from any lot which may unreasonably 
interfere with the reception of television or radio signals 
upon any other lot. 
Marshall Wilson, Jr. provided a copy of the restrictive covenant 
contained in deeds for the Bell Martin Addition #2, Irving, 
Texas. It is binding upon all of the owners or purchasers of the 
lots in the said addition, his or their heirs, executors, 
administrators or assigns. It reads: 
No antenna or tower shall be erected upon any lot for the 
purposes of radio operations. 
William J. Hamilton resides in an"apartment building in 
Gladstone, Missouri. He cites a clause in his lease prohibiting 
the erection of an antenna. He states that he has been forced to 
give up operation amateur radio equipment except a hand-held 2 
meter (144-148 MHz) radio transceiver. He maintains that he 
should not be penalized just because he lives in an apartment. 
Other restrictive covenants are less global in scope than 
those cited above. For example, Robert Webb purchased a home in 
Houston, Texas. His deed restriction prohibited "transmitting or 
receiving antennas extending above the roof line." 
8. Amateur operators generally oppose restrictive covenants 
for several reasons. They maintain that such restrictions limit 
the places that they can reside if they want to pursue their 
hobby of amateur radio. Some state that they impinge on First 
Amendment rights of speech. Others believe that a constitutional 
right is being abridged because, in their view, everyone has a 
right to access the airwaves regardless of where they live. 
9. The contrary belief held by housing subdivision 
communities and condominium or homeowner's associations is that 
amateur radio installations constitute safety hazards, cause 
interference to other electronic equipment which may be operated 
in the home (television, radio, stereos) or are eyesores that 
detract from the aesthetic and tasteful appearance of the housing 
development or apartment complex. To counteract these negative 
consequences, the subdivisions and associations include in their 
deeds, leases or by-laws, restrictions and limitations on the 
location and height of antennas or, in some cases, prohibit them 
altogether. The restrictive covenants are contained in the 
contractual agreement entered into at the time of the sale or 
lease of the property. Purchasers or lessees are free to choose 
whether they wish to reside where such restrictions on amateur 
antennas are in effect or settle elsewhere. 
Supporting Comments 
10. The Department of Defense (DOD) supported the ARRL and 
emphasized in its comments that continued success of existing 
national security and emergency preparedness telecommunications 
plans involving amateur stations would be severely diminished if 
state and local ordinances were allowed to prohibit the 
construction and usage of effective amateur transmission 
facilities. DOD utilizes volunteers in the Military Affiliate 
Radio Service (MARS), \fn 4/ Civil Air Patrol (CAP) and the Radio 
Amateur Civil Emergency Service (RACES). It points out that 
these volunteer communicators are operating radio equipment 
installed in their homes and that undue restrictions on antennas 
by local authorities adversely affect their efforts. DOD states 
that the responsiveness of these volunteer systems would be 
impaired if local ordinances interfere with the effectiveness of 
these important national telecommunication resources. DOD favors 
the issuance of a ruling that would set limits for local and 
state regulatory bodies when they are dealing with amateur 
stations. 
11. Various chapters of the American Red Cross also came. 
forward to support the ARRL's request for a preemptive ruling. 
The Red Cross works closely with amateur radio volunteers. It 
believes that without amateurs' dedicated support, disaster 
relief operations would significantly suffer and that its ability 
to serve disaster victims would be hampered. It feels that 
antenna height limitations that might be imposed by local bodies 
will negatively affect the service now rendered by the 
volunteers. 
12. Cities and counties from various parts of the United 
States filed comments in support of the ARRL's request for a 
Federal preemption ruling. The comments from the Director of 
Civil Defense, Port Arthur, Texas are representative: 
The Amateur Radio Service plays a vital role with our Civil 
Defense program here in Port Arthur and the design of these 
antennas and towers lends greatly to our ability to 
communicate during times of disaster. We do not believe 
there should be any restrictions on the antennas and towers 
except for reasonable safety precautions. Tropical storms, 
hurricanes and tornadoes are a way of life here on the Texas 
Gulf Coast and good communications are absolutely essential 
when preparing for a hurricane and even more so during 
recovery operations after the hurricane has past. 
13. The Quarter Century Wireless Association took a strong 
stand in favor of the Issuance of a declaratory ruling. It 
believes that Federal preemption is necessary so that there will 
be uniformity for all Amateur Radio installations on private 
property throughout the United States. 
14. In its comments, the ARRL argued that the Commission has 
the jurisdiction to preempt certain local land use regulations 
which frustrate or prohibit amateur radio communications. It 
said that the appropriate standard in preemption cases is not the 
extent of state and local interest in a given regulation, but 
rather the impact of the regulation on Federal goals. Its 
position is that Federal preemption is warranted whenever local 
government regulations relate adversely to the operational 
aspects of amateur communication. The ARRL maintains that 
localities routinely employ a variety of land use devices to 
preclude the installation of effective amateur antennas, 
including height restrictions, conditional use permits, building 
setbacks and dimensional limitations on antennas. It sees a 
declaratory ruling of Federal preemption as necessary to cause 
municipalities to accommodate amateur operator needs in land use 
planning efforts. 
15. James C. O'Connell, an attorney who has represented 
several amateurs before local zoning authorities, said that 
requiring amateurs to seek variances or special use approval to 
erect reasonable antennas unduly restricts the operation of 
amateur stations. He suggested that the Commission preempt 
zoning ordinances which impose antenna height limits of less than 
65 feet. He said that this height would represent a reasonable 
accommodation of the communication needs of most amateurs and the 
legitimate concerns of local zoning authorities. 
Opposing Comments 
16. The City of La Mesa, California has a zoning regulation 
which controls amateur antennas. Its comments reflected an 
attempt to reach a balanced view. 
This regulation has neither the intent, nor the effect, of 
precluding or inhibiting effective and reliable communications. 
Such antennas may be built as long as their construction does not 
unreasonably block views or constitute eyesores. The reasonable 
assumption is that there are always alternatives at a given site 
for different placement, and/or methods for aesthetic treatment. 
Thus, both public objectives of controlling land use for the 
public health, safety, and convenience, and providing an 
effective communications network, can be satisfied. A blanket to 
completely set aside local control, or a ruling which recognizes 
control only for the purpose of safety of antenna construction, 
would be contrary to...legitimate local control. 
17. Comments from the County of San Diego state: 
While we are aware of the benefits provided by amateur operators, 
we oppose the issuance of a preemption ruling which would elevate 
"antenna effectiveness' to a position above all other 
considerations. We must, however, argue that the local 
government must have the ability to place reasonable limitations 
upon the placement and configuration of amateur radio 
transmitting and receiving antennas. Such ability is necessary 
to assure that the local decision-makers have the authority to 
protect the public health, safety and welfare of all citizens. 
In conclusion, I would like to emphasize an important 
difference between your regulatory powers and that of local 
governments. Your Commission's approval of the preemptive 
requests would establish a "national policy." However, any 
regulation adopted by a local jurisdiction could be overturned by 
your Commission or a court if such regulation was determined to 
be unreasonable. 
18. The City of Anderson, Indiana, summarized some of the 
problems that face local communities: 
I am sympathetic to the concerns of these antenna owners and I 
understand that to gain the maximum reception from their devices, 
optimal location is necessary. However, the preservation of 
residential zoning districts as "liveable" neighborhoods is 
jeopardized by placing these antennas in front yards of homes. 
Major problems of public safety have been encountered, 
particularly vision blockage for auto and pedestrian access. In 
addition, all communities are faced with various building lot 
sizes. Many building lots are so small that established setback 
requirements (in order to preserve adequate air and light) are 
vulnerable to the unregulated placement of antennas. 
...the exercise of preemptive authority by the FCC in 
granting this request would not be in the best interest of the 
general public. 
19. The National Association of Counties (NACO), the American 
Planning Association (APA) and the National League of Cities 
(NCL) all opposed the issuance of an antenna preemption ruling. 
NACO emphasized that federal and state power must be viewed in 
harmony and warns that Federal intrusion into local concerns of 
health, safety and welfare could weaken the traditional police 
power exercised by the state and unduly interfere with the 
legitimate activities of the states. NLC believed that both 
Federal and local interests can be accommodated without 
preempting local authority to regulate the installation of 
amateur radio antennas. The APA said that the FCC should 
continue to leave the issue of regulating amateur antennas with 
the local government and with the state and Federal courts. 
Discussion 
20. When considering preemption, we must begin with two 
constitutional provisions. The tenth amendment provides that any 
powers which the constitution either does not delegate to the 
United States or does not prohibit the states from exercising are 
reserved to the states. These are the police powers of the 
states. The Supremacy Clause, however, provides that the 
constitution and the laws of the United States shall supersede 
any state law to the contrary. Article III, Section 2. Given 
these basic premises, state laws may be preempted in three ways: 
First, Congress may expressly preempt the state law. See Jones 
v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977). Or, Congress may 
indicate its intent to completely occupy a given field so that 
any state law encompassed within that field would implicitly be 
preempted. Such intent to preempt could be found in a 
congressional regulatory scheme that was so pervasive that it 
would be reasonable to assume that Congress did not intend to 
permit the states to supplement it. See Fidelity Federal Savings 
& Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982). Finally, 
preemption may be warranted when state law conflicts with federal 
law. Such conflicts may occur when "compliance with both Federal 
and state regulations is a physical impossibility," Florida Lime 
& Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142, 143 (1963), 
or when state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment 
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress," 
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). Furthermore, 
federal regulations have the same preemptive effect as federal 
statues, Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Association v. de la 
Cuesta, supra. 
21. The situation before us requires us to determine the 
extent to which state and local zoning regulations may conflict 
with federal policies concerning amateur radio operators. 
22. Few matters coming before us present such a clear 
dichotomy of view point as does the instant issue. The cities, 
countries, local communities and housing associations see an 
obligation to all of their citizens and try to address their 
concerns. This is accomplished through regulations, ordinances 
or covenants oriented toward the health, safety and general 
welfare of those they regulate. At the opposite pole are the 
individual amateur operators and their support groups who are 
troubled by local regulations which may inhibit the use of 
amateur stations or, in some instances, totally preclude amateur 
communications. Aligned with the operators are such entities as 
the Department of Defense, the American Red Cross and local civil 
defense and emergency organizations who have found in Amateur 
Radio a pool of skilled radio operators and a readily available 
backup network. In this situation, we believe it is appropriate 
to strike a balance between the federal interest in promoting 
amateur operations and the legitimate interests of local 
governments in regulating local zoning matters. The cornerstone 
on which we will predicate our decision is that a reasonable 
accommodation may be made between the two sides. 
23. Preemption is primarily a function of the extent of the 
conflict between federal and state and local regulation. Thus, 
in considering whether our regulations or policies can tolerate a 
state regulation, we may consider such factors as the severity of 
the conflict and the reasons underlying the state's regulations. 
In this regard, we have previously recognized the legitimate and 
important state interests reflected in local zoning regulations. 
For example, in Earth Satellite Communications, Inc., 95 FCC 2d 
1223 (1983), we recognized that 
...countervailing state interests inhere in the present 
situation...For example, we do not wish to preclude a state or 
locality from exercising jurisdiction over certain elements of an 
SMATV operation that properly may fall within its authority, such 
as zoning or public safety and health, provided the regulation in 
question is not undertaken as a pretext for the actual purpose of 
frustrating achievement of the preeminent federal objective and 
so long as the non-federal regulation is applied in a 
nondiscriminatory manner. 
24. Similarly, we recognize here that there are certain 
general state and local interests which may, in their even-handed 
application, legitimately affect amateur radio facilities. 
Nonetheless, there is also a strong federal interest in promoting 
amateur communications. Evidence of this interest may be found 
in the comprehensive set of rules that the Commission has adopted 
to regulate the amateur service. \fn 5/ Those rules set forth 
procedures for the licensing of stations and operators, frequency 
allocations, technical standards which amateur radio equipment 
must meet and operating practices which amateur operators must 
follow. We recognize the amateur radio service as a voluntary, 
noncommercial communication service, particularly with respect to 
providing emergency communications. Moreover, the amateur radio 
service provides a reservoir of trained operators, technicians 
and electronic experts who can be called on in times of national 
or local emergencies. By its nature, the Amateur Radio Service 
also provides the opportunity for individual operators to further 
international goodwill. Upon weighing these interests, we 
believe a limited preemption policy is warranted. State and 
local regulations that operate to preclude amateur communications 
in their communities are in direct conflict with federal 
objectives and must be preempted. 
25. Because amateur station communications are only as 
effective as the antennas employed, antenna height restrictions 
directly affect the effectiveness of amateur communications. 
Some amateur antenna configurations require more substantial 
installations than others if they are to provide the amateur 
operator with the communications that he/she desires to engage 
in. For example, an antenna array for international amateur 
communications will differ from an antenna used to contact other 
amateur operators at shorter distances. We will not, however, 
specify any particular height limitation below which a local 
government may not regulate, nor will we suggest the precise 
language that must be contained in local ordinances, such as 
mechanisms for special exceptions, variances, or conditional use 
permits. Nevertheless, local regulations which involve 
placement, screening, or height of antennas based on health, 
safety, or aesthetic considerations must be crafted to 
accommodate reasonably amateur communications, and to represent 
the minimum practicable regulation to accomplish the local 
authority's legitimate purpose. \fn 6/ 
26. Obviously, we do not have the staff or financial 
resources to review all state and local laws that affect amateur 
operations. We are confident, however, that state and local 
governments will endeavor to legislate in a manner that affords 
appropriate recognition to the important federal interest at 
stake here and thereby avoid unnecessary conflicts with federal 
policy, as well as time-consuming and expensive litigation in 
this area. Amateur operators who believe that local or state 
governments have been overreaching and thereby have precluded 
accomplishment of their legitimate communications goals, may, in 
addition, use this document to bring our policies to the 
attention of local tribunals and forums. 
27. Accordingly, the Request for Declaratory Ruling filed 
July 16, 1984, by the American Radio Relay League, Inc., IS 
GRANTED to the extent indicated herein and in all other respects, 
IS DENIED. 
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION 
William J. Tricarico 
Secretary 
Page last modified: 04:35 PM, 10 Apr 1995 ET 
Page author: reginfo@arrl.org 
Copyright © 1995, American Radio Relay League, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 
Title/Chapter/Section: | [ _ 7 ........... .... ... G o T o 1 
Utah Code 
Title10 Utah Municipal Code 
Chapter 9a Municipal Land Use, Development, and Management 
Section 515 Regulation of amateur radio antennas. 
10-9a-515. Regulation of amateur radio antennas. 
(1) A municipality may not enact or enforce an ordinance that does not comply with the ruling of the 
Federal Communications Commission in "Amateur Radio Preemption, 101 FCC 2nd 952 (1985)" or a 
regulation related to amateur radio service adopted under 47 C.F.R. Part 97. 
(2) If a municipality adopts an ordinance involving the placement, screening, or height of an amateur 
radio antenna based on health, safety, or aesthetic conditions, the ordinance shall: 
(a) reasonably accommodate amateur radio communications; and 
(b) represent the minimal practicable regulation to accomplish the municipality's purpose. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 254, 2005 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WordPerfect 10_09a051500.ZIP 1,883 Bytes 
« Previous Section (10-9a-514) Next Section (10-9a-516) » 
17-27a-514. Regulation of amateur radio antennas. 
(1) A county may not enact or enforce an ordinance that does not comply with the ruling of the 
Federal Communications Commission in "Amateur Radio Preemption, 101 FCC 2nd 952 (1985)" or a 
regulation related to amateur radio service adopted under 47 C.F.R. Part 97. 
(2) If a county adopts an ordinance involving the placement, screening, or height of an amateur radio 
antenna based on health, safety, or aesthetic conditions, the ordinance shall: 
(a) reasonably accommodate amateur radio communications; and 
(b) represent the minimal practicable regulation to accomplish the county's purpose. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 254, 2005 General Session 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Joel Sill, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Bill Hart dba Hart 
Construction, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
OPINION 
For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20050245-CA 
F I L E D 
(December 15, 2005) 
2005 UT App 537 
Third District, Silver Summit Department, 020500012 
The Honorable Deno Himonas 
Attorneys: David B. Thompson, Park City, for Appellant 
Robert J. Dale, P. Bruce Badger, and Bradley L. Tilt, 
Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Davis, Greenwood, and Thorne. 
DAVIS, Judge: 
fl Plaintiff-counterclaim defendant Joel Sill appeals from a 
final judgment and award of prejudgment interest, attorney fees, 
and court costs in favor of Defendant-counterclaimant Bill Hart. 
We reverse and remand. 
BACKGROUND 
i|2 Sill is the owner of real property loca 
Utah (the Property). Hart, a general contra 
construction on the Property in the summer o 
until approximately December 2001, at which 
job over a dispute with Sill regarding the c 
project. In January 2 0 02, Sill brought an a 
alleging (1) breach of contract, (2) breach 
good faith and fair dealing, (3) breach of f 
negligent misrepresentation, (5) intentional 
(6) unjust enrichment, and (7) defamation 
in February 2002, alleging breach of contrac 
ted in Summit County, 
ctor, began 
f 1999 and continued 
time Hart left the 
ompletion of the 
ction against Hart, 
of the covenant of 
iduciary duty, (4) 
misrepresentation, 
Hart counterclaimed 
t and unjust 
1-11(4)(a) does not apply to his claim because he filed a 
counterclaim as opposed to a "complaint" and because Sill has no 
rights under the Residence Lien Restriction and Lien Recovery 
Fund Act. Sill, on the other hand, argues not only that section 
38-1-11 (4) (a) is applicable, but also that the language of 
section 38-1-11(4) (e) makes subsection 4(a) a jurisdictional 
provision. Sill therefore contends that Hart's failure to comply 
with section 38-1-11(4) (a) deprived the trial court of 
jurisdiction to hear Hart's lien foreclosure action. 
1(7 Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law 
that are reviewed "for correctness, giving no deference to the 
district court's interpretation." Board of Educ. v. Sandy City 
Corp. , 2004 UT 37,1(8, 94 P. 3d 234. "The determination of whether 
a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, 
which we review for correctness, according no deference to the 
[trial] court's determination." Beaver County v. Qwest, Inc., 
2001 UT 81,1(8, 31 P.3d 1147. 
ANALYSIS 
f8 Prior to addressing Sill's jurisdictional claim, we first 
determine whether section 38-1-11(4)(a) is even applicable in 
this case. The language at issue here states: 
If a lien claimant files an action to enforce 
a lien filed under [the Mechanics' Liens Act] 
involving a residence, as defined in 
[s]ection 38-11-102, [2] the lien claimant 
shall include with the service of the 
complaint on the owner of the residence: 
(i) instructions to the owner of the 
residence relating to the owner's rights 
under Title 38, Chapter 11, Residence Lien 
Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act; and 
(ii) a form affidavit and motion for 
summary judgment to enable the owner of the 
residence to specify the grounds upon which 
the owner may exercise available rights under 
Title 38, Chapter 11, Residence Lien 
Restriction and Lien Recovery Fund Act. 
2Under Utah Code section 38-11-102, a "residence" is defined 
as "an improvement to real property used or occupied, to be used 
or occupied as, or in conjunction with, a primary or secondary 
detached single-family dwelling or multifamily dwelling up to two 
units, including factory built housing." Utah Code Ann. § 38-11-
102 (20) (2001) . 
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State of Utah, No. 20050001 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
F I L E D 
R a l p h L e v i n , 
Defendant and Petitioner. September 8, 2006 
Fourth District, Provo Dept. 
The Honorable Lynn W. Davis 
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On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
DURRANT, Justice: 
INTRODUCTION 
Hi The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
protects against self-incrimination.1 To preserve this right, 
the U.S. Supreme Court has held that defendants subjected to 
custodial interrogation are entitled to a Miranda warning.2 
Where such a warning is not given, any incriminating statements 
made by a defendant during the custodial interrogation are 
excluded from evidence.3 We granted certiorari in this case to 
1
 U.S. Const, amend V. 
2
 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
3
 Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 297, 300-01 (1980); 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45; Salt Lake City v. Carner, 664 P.2d 
(continued...) 
for determining an issue."14 Standards of review should allocate 
discretion between the trial and appellate courts in a way that 
takes account of the "relative capabilities of each level of the 
court system to take evidence and make findings of fact in the 
face of conflicting evidence, on one hand, and to set binding 
jurisdiction-wide policy, on the other."15 These considerations 
are critical in selecting a standard of review from along a 
spectrum of deference that runs from highly deferential review 
under a "clearly erroneous" standard on one end to completely 
nondeferential review under a "correctness" standard on the other 
end.16 
[^20 Because a trial court is in a better position to 
xxjudg[e] credibility and resolv[e] evidentiary conflicts," an 
appellate court reviews the trial court's findings of fact for 
clear error.17 Conversely, an appellate court reviews a trial 
court's conclusions of law for correctness because ua single 
trial judge is in an inferior position to determine what the 
legal content of [a legal concept] should be [whereas] a panel of 
appellate judges, with their collective experience and their 
broader perspective, is better suited to that task."18 
Additionally, the published decisions of appellate courts 
xxprovid[e] state-wide standards that guide law enforcement and 
prosecutorial officials."19 
i|21 The analytical complexity of our standard of review is 
at its height when we review a trial court's application of a 
legal concept to a given set of facts. When we review so-called 
State v. Thurman, 869 P.2d 1256, 1265-66 (Utah 1993) . 
Id. at 1266. 
16
 .See Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994) ("[0]ne can 
visualize the traditional standard-of-review scheme as a 
continuum of deference anchored at either end by the clearly 
erroneous and correction-of-error standards, which correspond 
with whether the issue is characterized as one of fact or of 
law."). 
17
 Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1271. 
18
 Id.; accord Pena, 869 P.2d at 936 ("[A]ppellate courts 
have traditionally been seen as having the power and duty to say 
what the law is and to ensure that it is uniform throughout the 
jurisdiction."). 
19
 Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1271. 
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"mixed questions of fact ^nd law," the considerations that favor 
a more-deferential standard of review and those that favor a 
less-deferential standard of review compete for dominance, and 
the amount of deference that results will vary according to the 
nature of the legal concept at issue. Mixed questions of fact 
and law involving different legal issues will often require 
different standards of review.20 
\12 While we have said that, ultimately, "the legal effect 
of [the] facts is the province of the appellate courts,"21 our 
prior decisions recognize that, with regard to many mixed 
questions of fact and law, it is either not possible or not wise 
for an appellate court to define strictly how a legal concept is 
to be applied to each new set of facts.22 Where the correct 
application of a legal concept is difficult to explain using a 
generally applicable standard, overinvolvement by an appellate 
court can lead to confusing and inconsistent pronouncements of 
the law.23 We have recognized that the application of such a 
legal concept incorporates a de facto grant of discretion to the 
trial court, and, accordingly, we review the trial court's 
decision on the mixed question of fact and law with deference 
commensurate to that discretion.24 
1(23 But with regard to certain mixed questions where 
uniform application is of high importance, as in the context of 
Fourth Amendment protections, we have held that policy 
considerations dictate that the application of the legal concept 
should be strictly controlled by the appellate courts.25 Thus, 
20
 See Pena, 869 P.2d at 938; see also Searle v. Milburn 
Irrig. Co., 2006 UT 16, \ 16, 133 P.3d 382 ("The measure of 
discretion afforded varies, however, according to the issue being 
reviewed." (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
21
 Drake v. Indus. Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
22
 See Pena, 869 P.2d at 938-40. 
23
 Id. at 940. 
24
 Id. at 937-39; State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, \ 27, 137 
P.3d 787. 
25
 See Brake, 2004 UT 95, \ \ 14-15; see also State v. 
Hansen, 2002 UT 125, \ 26, 63 P.3d 650 (stating that there must 
be "statewide standards that guide law enforcement and 
(continued...) 
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considerations in our decision in Brake37 and treated policy 
considerations as a "fourth" Pena factor in State v. Virgin.38 
Thus, to clarify the appropriate test, we have rephrased the 
factors here in a manner that better reflects their usefulness in 
selecting a standard of review from somewhere along the spectrum 
of deference. 
129 In the process of rephrasing the test, we have dropped 
the "novelty" factor because it has rarely, if ever, proven to be 
helpful to our analysis. As it was phrased in Pena, the novelty 
factor considered whether "the situation to which the legal 
principle is to be applied is sufficiently new to the courts that 
appellate judges are unable to anticipate and articulate 
definitively what factors should be outcome determinative."39 
The situations in which this factor required more deferential 
review were unclear. Our cases demonstrate that legal issues 
involving situations that are completely new to the appellate 
courts are rare. Furthermore, where a situation is novel, it is 
not self-evident that the appellate courts should restrain 
themselves from exercising searching review and should instead 
take a wait-and-see approach to establishing a legal test. In 
the language of the pasture metaphor, we are not convinced that 
we should necessarily refrain from establishing fences that 
restrain trial courts simply because a situation is novel and 
anticipating the future development of the law may be difficult. 
1(3 0 Furthermore, because this "novelty" factor was 
prominent in the original Pena test despite its rare 
applicability, it has often proven unwieldy, cluttered the 
analysis, or been ignored. For example, we have sometimes stated 
that the situation presented was not "new," but then have 
addressed whether we could articulate "outcome determinative 
factors."40 The later inquiry is substantially the same as the 
37
 2004 UT 95, HH 14-15. 
38
 2006 UT 29, 1 28. 
39
 869 P.2d at 939. 
40
 See Searle v. Milburn Irr. Co., 2006 UT 16, U 17, 133 
P.3d 3 82 (concluding that "at least some deference should be 
granted to the district court's application of the law to the 
facts" where it was "exceedingly difficult to craft a uniform 
rule neatly applicable in all situations"); Butler, Crockett & 
Walsh Dev. Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating, 2004 UT 67, 
(continued...) 
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inquiry that we make under the first factor, namely: the degree 
to which the variety and complexity of the facts make it 
difficult to articulate a legal test or factors that are outcome 
determinative. Such mixing of the separate analytical inquiries 
from the first and second original Pena factors has only served 
to confuse the analysis and may have led appellate courts to 
place too much weight on the difficulty of articulating a rule. 
Ultimately, in the rare instances where this "novelty of the 
situation" factor may be important, it could fall under the 
umbrella of other policy considerations. 
f31 In making these changes to the way that we articulate 
the established standard, our intent is to improve upon our 
statement of the test that we apply to mixed questions of fact 
and law without changing its core substance. As before, our goal 
in applying the above balancing test is to allocate tasks between 
the trial and appellate courts based on their institutional roles 
and competencies. 
II. WHETHER A DEFENDANT WAS SUBJECTED TO CUSTODIAL 
INTERROGATION IS A MIXED QUESTION OF FACT AND LAW THAT 
WE REVIEW FOR CORRECTNESS. 
i)32 Having set forth the balancing test to be used in 
selecting an appropriate standard of review for a mixed question 
of fact and law, we now apply the test to answer the question at 
hand; namely, what is the standard appellate courts apply in 
reviewing a trial court's determination that a person was or was 
not subjected to custodial interrogation for the purpose of Fifth 
Amendment Miranda protections? To do so, we will first outline 
the legal concept of custodial interrogation in the context of 
our Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. We will then apply the three-
factor balancing test to the mixed question of custodial 
interrogation, discussing each of the three factors in turn. 
40
 ( . . . continued) 
% 47, 98 P.3d 1 (concluding that the second factor supported 
additional deference to a trial court's beneficial use 
determination, even though the beneficial use doctrine "has roots 
dating back to the turn of the last century"); Jeffs v. Stubbs, 
970 P.2d 1234, 1245 (Utah 1998) (concluding that although "the 
unjust enrichment doctrine has ancient roots," the second factor 
supported a "broad degree of discretion in applying the law" 
where "the court's ability to state clearly the outcome-
determinative factors remains elusive"). 
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Karl G. Peterson 
70 West 400 North 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
AMERICAN FORK CITY, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
V S . ; 
KARL G. PETERSON ] 
70 West 400 North ] 
American Fork, UT 84003 ] 
DOB: 07-26-59 ] 
Defendant ] 
1 Motions for Dismissal 
I Case No. 081100531 
) Judge Howard H. Maetani 
COMES NOW THE DEFENDANT and MOVES FOR DISMISSAL of the Charges against him based 
on any of the the following: 
First Motion for Dismissal. 
1. 1. American Fork City Ordinances, Section 8.08.040 appoints Walt Farmer as the city inspector 
2. 
3. for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the chapter. 
2, 2. The INFORMATION gives the witness as Darren Falslev. 
2. 3. Since a specific individual is identified as the only person who can make a determination under 
3. 
4. the chapter, an action can only be sustained upon the testimony of that specific individual. 
The INFORMATION not being based upon the proper witness, Defendant moves for Dismissal with 
prejudice. i 
Second Motion for Dismissal 
4 Defendant is licensed as an Amateur Radio Operator. 
5. Many municipalities have used Nuisance Abatement and Beautification ordinances to limit the 
5. 
6. activities of Amateur Radio Operators. 
6, These actions resulted in the issuance of PRB-1 by the Federal Communications Commission 
6. and cited as "Amateur Radio Preemption. 101 FCC 2nd 952 (1985)" 
7 PRB-1 required reasonable accommodations starting in 1985. 
8. Chapter 8.08 was enacted in 4/90 and makes no mention of amateur radio or reasonable 
8. 
9. accommodations. 
c9. The State of Utah enacted UCA 10-9a-515 in 2005 stating that an ordinance that does not 
9. comply with PRB-1 may not be enforced. 
10. An action on an unenforceable statute cannot be sustained. 
Defendant asks the Court to rule that Chapter 8.08 is trumped by State Law, rendered unenforceable, 
and that this action be dismissed. 
Karl G. Peterson 
70 West 400 North 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
AMERICAN FORK CITY, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
KARL G.PETERSON ] 
70 West 400 North 
American Fork, UT 84003 
Defendant ] 
1 Response to 
1 MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
) DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DSIMISS 
) Case No. 081100531 
) Judge Howard H. Maetani 
Comes now the Defendant and responds to the Plaintiffs answer to Defendants Motion to Dismiss as 
follows: 
In Re: FACTS: 
I. Each of the Plaintiffs first four bullets alleges things that have not been entered 
2. 
3. into evidence, are not subject to cross-examination, are gross hyperbole, 
4. 
5. or are immaterial to the motion at hand. 
6. 
7. The fifth bullet merely restates the charge, is redundant and is immaterial to the motion before 
8. 
9. the court. 
10. 
II. As Plaintiff teaches us, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 10(h) allows the court to 
12. 
13. disregard redundant and immaterial matter. 
14. 
15. Defendant asks the court to strike and disregard bullets 1 through 5. 
In Re: Section I Argument: 
4. In the first paragraph, Plaintiff makes reference to the 8.08 "Nuisance Abatement and 
5. 
6. Beautification" ordinance of American Fork City. 
7. 
8. Plaintiff has not enclosed a copy of that ordinance for the benefit of the court or the defendant.. 
9. 
10. Defendant now does so as an attachment to this pleading. 
11. 
12. These photocopies were obtained at American Fork Public Library from a binder in the second 
13. 
14. floor locked records room; access information: Hist, 349.792, Ame. 
15. 
16. Defendant took a copy of that section to the American Fork City offices prior to drafting his 
17. 
18. Motion to Dismiss and asked the Assistant Recorder to compare it to the book in their 
vault. 
19. 
20. She said it was the same. 
21. 
22. Defendant is left to wonder just where the Plaintiff is quoting from, as the Ordinances 
23. 
24. available to the public at the American Fork Public Library, and those in the vault at 
25. 
26. City Hall do not contain the 8.08.40 language that Plaintiff purports to quote. 
27. 
28. It is a fundamental principle of our system that laws are public documents and that 
29. 
30. defendants have access to the law. 
31. 
32. As an example, the State of Utah maintains a website, in addition to the one that WestLaw 
33. 
34. maintains, that anyone with an internet connection can access. 
35. 
36. If the Ordinances of American Fork are not available for public access, but only available to 
37. 
38. the prosecutor, a fundamental tenet of our system is violated. 
39. 
40. The Ordinances which are available for public access must be used. 
41. 
42. If American Fork wishes to enforce a different law, then American Fork should maintain, 
43. 
44. at a minimum, the book in the American Fork Public Library. 
45. 
46. To allow books purporting to be the ordinances of American Fork to exist in the 
47. 
48. American Fork Public Library, and the Harold B. Lee Law Library, without something to 
49. 
50. direct a citizen to where the law "in reality" may be found is something that this court 
51. 
52. should not tolerate. 
53. 
54. Maintaining the book in the Harold B. Lee Law Library would be a good practice. 
55. 
56. Maintaining a website, similar to that of the State of Utah would be a good practice. 
57. 
58. Having the only up-to-date an valid copy of the Ordinances of American Fork solely in 
59. 
60. the hands of the Prosecutor, if that is what he quotes from, is not good public policy. 
61. 
62. This court should not allow such conduct. 
63. 
64. Defendant asks the court to rule that the law that should govern is that which is 
65. 
66. publicly viewable in the American Fork City Library. 
67. 
68. Defendant again moves that this case be dismissed with prejudice. 
69. 
70. The last paragraph represents an interesting way to slip in another witness and bolster 
71. 
72. the "Facts" introduced earlier. 
73. 
74. The added name is still not Walt Farmer. 
In Re: Section II: 
25. Plaintiff appears to misunderstand or misinterpret PRB-1. 
26. 
27. PRB-1 addresses the radio towers and radio antennas of Amateur Radio Operators. 
28. 
29. PRB-1 indicates that many municipalities have tried to regulate towers which may be 
30. 
31. many feet above the ground and well above the surrounding houses and fences 
32. 
33. via nuisance and beautification ordinances such as this one. 
34. 
35. PRB-1 states that since the FCC regulates Amateur Radio towers and antennas, that 
36. 
37. local authorities may not, but must reasonably accommodate them.. 
38. 
39. UCA 10-9a-515 requires local Ordinances to address PRB-1 or be unenforceable. 
40. 
41. The Ordinance makes no mention of towers, antennas or reasonable accommodations. 
42. 
43. The Ordinance is not in compliance with PRB-1 and is therefore out of compliance with 
44. UCA 10-9a-515 and may not be enforced. 
45. 
46. Plaintiff is asking for the removal of items from which Defendant intends to 
47. 
48. construct an Amateur Radio Tower. 
49. 
50. Plaintiff has/tlone this without any in person contact or permission. 
51. 
52. Plaintiff has trespassed upon Defendant property. 
53. 
54. Defendant moves for dismissal with prejudice. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Defendant asks the court to grant his Motion To Dismiss. 
DATED this 25th day of July, 2008. 
Karl Peterson 
Certificate of Delivery 
I hereby certify that I deposited a true and correct copy of the forgoing Response with the Court 
and in the box of the Plaintiff at the courthouse on this 25th day of July, 2008 
Karl Peterson 
Karl G. Peterson 
70 West 400 North 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
FILFO IN 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAHM&Nf? A 8'- 33 
AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAflj , - r"TAH 
UFAHCOUMTY © 
AMERICAN FORK CITY, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
KARL G. PETERSON ] 
70 West 400 North ; 
American Fork, UT 84003 ] 
DOB: 07-26-59 
Defendant 
1 Motion to Set Aside The Judgment 
) Case No. 081100531 
) Judge Howard H. Maetani 
Comes now the Defendant and alleges* 
1. The Pretrial conference was truncated when the defendant announced his intent to Move for 
Dismissal. vlv K * * 
2. A pretrial conference was not actually preformed by order of the Court. 
3. No witness list was furnished to Defendant by Prosecution prior to the trial. 
4. These factors constitute a breach of due process. 
Wherefore, Defendant moves that the Judgment be set aside, or vacated, and that a Pretrial Conference 
be scheduled. 
Submitted to the Court this 17th day of December, 2008 
Karl Peterson 
8,08.010—8.08.030 
Chapter 8.08 
NUISANCE ABATEMENT AND BEAUTIFICATION 
SectionsJ 
8.08.010 Purpose. 
8.08.020 Civil and criminal remedies. 
8.08.030 Prohibited conduct—Definition of nuisance. 
8.08.040 Inspection and administration. 
8.08.050 Notice to property owners. 
8.08.060 Failure to comply—Removal of nuisance. 
8.08.070 Criminal penalty. 
8.08.010 Purpose. It is the purpose of this chapter 
to establish a means whereby the city may designate and reg-
ulate the abatement of injurious and noxious weeds, garbage, 
refuse or any unsightly or deleterious objects of struc-
tures, and to establish a means whereby the city may prose-
cute the violation of this chapter as a criminal offense, 
pursuant to the powers granted to the city by Chapter 11 of 
Title 10 and Sections 10-8-60 and 10-8-61, Utah Code An-
notated, 1953, as amended. (Ord. 86-05-09 SKpart), 1986) 
8.08.020 Civil and criminal remedies. The city may 
enforce this chapter by using the abatement procedure set 
forth herein, by charging the violator with a criminal of-
fense, or by both. The civil and criminal remedies provided 
herein are not mutually exclusive. The city may elect to 
deal with violators civilly, criminally, or both civilly and 
criminally. (Ord. 86-05-09 §l(part), 1986) 
8.08.030 Prohibited conduct—Definition of nuisance. 
Without limiting the general application of this chapter, 
the following conduct shall be considered a nuisance, and 
may be abated as set forth herein, prosecuted criminally, or 
both: 
A. Noxious Weeds# Garbage, Refuse and Unsightly or 
Deleterious Objects. It is unlawful, and shall be con-
sidered a nuisance, for any owner or occupant of real prop-
erty located within the city limits to allow the accumu-
lation or growth of noxious weeds, garbage, refuse, or any 
unsightly of deleterious objects, conditions/ or structures 
on such property, when such objects, conditions or struc-
tures create a fire hazard/ a source of contamination or 
pollution of water, air or property, a danger to health, a 
breeding ground or habitation for insects or rodents or oth-
er forms of life deleterious to human habitation, or when 
such objects, conditions/ or structures are unsightly or 
deleterious to their surroundings. 
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8.08.040--8.08.050 
B. Abandoned, Wrecked or Junk Vehicles. It is 
unlawful, and shall be considered a nuisance, for any owner 
or occupant of real property located within the city lim-
its, to park, store or leave, or to permit the parking, 
storing or leaving of any licensed or unlicensed motor 
vehicle of any kind, or parts thereof, which is in a 
wrecked, junked, partially dismantled, inoperative or aban-
doned condition, whether attended or not, upon such proper-
ty, for a period of time in excess of seventy-two hours, 
except that two or less such vehicles or parts thereof may 
be stored if within a building, or placed behind an opaque 
screening fence; and except that such vehicles and parts 
may be within a junkyard or automobile wrecking yard law-
fully established under the ordinances and laws of the 
city; provided that such methods of storage do not violate 
any other city ordinances or regulations. Any vehicles 
accumulated in violation of the terms of this subparagraph 
shall be considered to be an unsightly or deleterious ob-
ject or structure for which the city may seek the civil 
and/or criminal remedies set forth in this chapter. 
C. Waste Material Accumulation. It is unlawful, and 
shall be considered a nuisance, for any owner or occupant 
of real property located within the city limits, to cause 
or permit junk, scrap metal, scrap lumber, waste paper 
products, discarded building materials, or any unused or 
abandoned machinery or machinery parts, or other waste 
materials, to be in or upon any such property unless in 
connection with a business enterprise lawfully situated and 
licensed for the same. Any waste material accumulated in 
violation of the terms of this subsection shall be consid-
ered to be an unsightly or deleterious object, condition or 
structure for which the city may seek the civil and/or 
criminal remedies set forth in this chapter. 
D. Definition of Unsightly. Whenever the term "un-
sightly" is used in this chapter, it shall mean ugly, dis-
pleasing or revolting to the sight. (Ord. 86-05-09 
§l(part), 1986) 
8.08.040 Inspection and administration. The mayor 
may appoint one or more individuals to serve as city in-
spectors, also known as "enforcement officers," who shall 
be and hereby are empowered to enforce and carry out the 
provisions of this chapter. Additionally, for purposes 
herein, the phrase "city inspector" shall include, by vir-
tue of their office or law enforcement responsibilities, 
the fire chief, fire marshal, zoning administrator, and any 
and all building inspectors and police officers of the 
city. (Ord. 98-09-41 §1, 1998: Ord. 86-05-09 §l(part), 
1986) 
8.08.050 Notice to property owners. The city inspec-
tor is authorized and directed to make careful examination 
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and investigation of real property located within the 
corporate limits of the city, for the growth and spread of 
injurious and noxious weeds, and for the existence of gar-
bage, refuse or unsightly or deleterious objects or struc-
tures. The city inspector shall ascertain the names of the 
owners and occupants of the premises, as well as the de-
scription of the premises where such weeds, garbage, re-
fuse, objects or 
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structures exist, and shall serve notice in writing upon the 
owner and occupant of such land, either personally or by 
mailing notice, postage prepaid, addressed to the owner at 
the last known post office address as disclosed by the re-
cords of the county assessor, and to the occupant at the ad-
dress of the subject property, requiring such owner or occu-
pant, as the case may be, to eradicate, or destroy and re-
move, the same within such time as the inspector may desig-
nate, which shall not be less than ten days from the date of 
service of such notice. One notice shall be deemed suffi-
cient on any lot or parcel of property for the entire season 
of weed growth during that calendar year. The inspector 
shall make proof of service of such notice under oath, and 
file the same in the office of the county treasurer. (Ord. 
86-05-09 Sl(part), 1986) 
8.08.060 Failure to comply—Removal of nuisance. If 
any owner or occupant of lands described in such notice 
shall fail or neglect to eradicate, or destroy and remove, 
such weeds, garbage, refuse, object or structure upon the 
premises in accordance with such notice, it shall be the du-
ty of the inspector, at the expense of the city, to employ 
necessary assistance and cause such weeds, garbage, refuse, 
objects or structures to be removed or destroyed. The in-
spector shall prepare an itemized statement of all expenses 
incurred in the removal and destruction of same and shall 
mail a copy thereof to the owner, demanding payment within 
twenty days of the date of mailing. The notice shall be 
deemed delivered when mailed by registered mail addressed to 
the property owner's last known address. In the event the 
owner fails to make payment of the amount set forth in the 
statement to the city treasurer within the twenty days, the 
inspector, on behalf of the city, may cause suit to be 
brought in an appropriate court of law or may refer the mat-
ter to the county treasurer as hereinafter provided. In the 
event collections of the costs are pursued through the 
courts, the city may sue for and receive judgment upon all 
of the costs of removal and destruction together with rea-
sonable attorney's fees, interest and court costs. The city 
may execute on such judgment in the manner provided by law. 
In the event that the inspector elects to refer the matter 
to the county treasurer for inclusion in the tax notice of 
the property owner, he shall make, in triplicate, an 
itemized statement of all expenses incurred in the removal 
and destruction of the same and shall deliver the three 
copies of the statement to the county treasurer within ten 
days after the completion of the work of removing such 
weeds, garbage, refuse, objects or structures. If the city 
inspector refers the matter to the county treasurer, the 
county treasurer shall pursue the collection of the cost of 
the work performed in accordance with the provisions of 
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Chapter 10, Title 11, Utah Code Annotated, 19 53, as amended, 
and the recalcitrant owner shall have such rights and shall 
be subject to such powers as are thereby granted. (Ord. 
86-05-09 Sl(part), 1986) 
8,08.070 Criminal penalty,, Any person violating any 
of the provisions of this chapter shall be guilty of a class 
B misdemeanor. (Ord. 86-05-09 §l(part), 1986) 
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